Abstract: Proxy signature allows an original signer to delegate his/her signing capability to a proxy signer such that the proxy signer can sign messages on behalf of the original signer. Blind signature allows a user to have a given message signed by the signer without revealing any information about the message. By using Schnorr blind signature, Tan et al. recently proposed a digital proxy blind signature scheme. They claimed that it satisfies the security properties of both blind signatures and proxy signatures. However, it is not the fact. This paper shows that the proposed scheme is vulnerable to universal forgery as well as linkability attacks. It also explains why their proofs of the security are incorrect. 
Introduction
Proxy signatures and blind signatures are regarded as two important types of digital signatures. Precisely, proxy signatures enable one party (Original signer) to delegate his/her signing capability to another party (Proxy signer) such that the proxy signer can sign messages on behalf of the original signer. Blind signatures enable one party (User) to have a message signed by another party (Signer) in such a way that the signer can not learn any information of the signed message. The concepts of proxy signature and blind signature were firstly introduced by Mambo [1] and Chaum [2] , in 1996 and 1983 respectively. Since then, many of both types of signatures were proposed [3−6] . Some of them [4, 5] are illustrated to be insecure [7, 8] and some of them [6] are still under study.
Due to the urgent requirements of proxy signatures as well as blind signatures in today's electronic commerce (e.g., in e-cash system, coins must be signed blindly by the bank for the anonymity of users; but to withdraw a coin from a branch of the bank, proxy signature needed. For more details, please refer to Ref. [3] ), proxy blind signatures inheriting the merits of both proxy and blind signatures have emerged. Since the first proxy blind signature proposed by Lin and Jan [9] in 2000, several new schemes were proposed based on different primitives [10−12] . Fox example, Tan et al.'s schemes [10, 11] are based on discrete logarithm problems and Zhang et al.'s scheme are based on bilinear pairings.
In this paper, we have a cryptanalysis on Tan et al.'s proxy blind signature scheme [10] . We demonstrate two effective attacks on their proposed scheme. One is called universal forgery attack, and the other is called linkability attack. Both attacks are vital to a proxy blind signature scheme. We will discuss them at length later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the security requirement a proxy blind signature should satisfy in Section 2 and then briefly review Tan et al.'s proposed scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the cryptanalysis on the scheme in detail. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Security Requirements of Proxy Blind Signatures
Since proxy blind signatures are combination of the proxy signatures and the blind signatures, they should certainly have the security properties of the proxy signatures [5] and blind signatures:
(1) Distinguishability: Proxy blind signatures are distinguishable from normal signatures by everyone.
(2) Verifiability: From a proxy blind signature, the verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement on the signed message. (6) Unmisusability: The proxy signer can only sign authorized messages. He/she cannot sign messages that have not been authorized by the original signer.
(7) Unlinkability: After proxy blind signature is created, the proxy signer cannot associate it with his previous signing transcripts.
Review of the Proxy Blind Signature Scheme
In this section we briefly recall the proxy blind signature scheme proposed in Ref. [8] .
System parameters
For readers, conveniency, we adopt the same notations as in Ref. [8] . Note that numbers will be used as exponents are the computed modulo q, others are the computed modulo p.
Hereafter we do not repeat them in equations below. 
Proxy delegation phase

Extraction phase
Unblinding. While reveiving , U computes
And then, the proxy blind signature is 
Verification
The recipient of a proxy blind signature verifies the validity of σ by checking whether or not 
Cryptanalysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we demonstrate two affective attacks on Tan et al's proposed scheme to show its insecurity. In the first attack, anyone can forge a proxy blind signature on any message he chooses. And the second attack says that the proxy signer can later associate a signature with corresponding signing transcripts.
Universal forgery attack
Suppose an adversary wants to forge a valid proxy blind signature on message m he chooses arbitrarily, he performs as follows.
• Choose randomly 
Linkability attack
After knowing a proxy signature 4-tuple (m,u,s,e), the proxy signer B can find its corresponding signing Theorem 2. The proxy signer can allege his own signature a proxy signature with a success probability q / 1 . Theorem 3. Anyone else (even the original signer) can impersonate the proxy signer and forge the proxy signature with a probability q / 1 .
Theorem 4.
When the protocol has been executed, the message sent to the signer is blind for the signer and the scheme achieves the unlinkability property.
Why the proofs fail
To prove Theorems 2 and 3, authors of Ref, [8] make an implicit assumption that forgers have to know the right proxy secret key s′ which contains the participants' secret keys x A and x B , thus rely the hardness on the discrete logarithm. Indeed, as in our universal forgery attack, it is completely unnecessary. The forgers only need to know y A and y B which are publicly known.
The failure of proving Theorem 4 is absolutely due to careless. Although finding solution to Eq.(1) itself (the random number b) is an instance of the discrete logarithm problems, it is obvious that Eq.(3) exactly gives such an solution since s and s″ are both known to the signer B.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that Tan et al's proxy blind signature is insecure by mounting two kinds of attacks. The universal forgery attack shows that it does not satisfy the unforgeability requirement and the second attack shows that it does not satisfy the unlinkability requirement. The attacks tell us that security proofs do not guarantee all things and also should be treated strictly and carefully.
